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Coping with Policy in Foresight1
A R T I C L E
Governments are in need of anticipating systems changes to reduce risks and stimulate desired 
developments. Although policy-oriented foresight proves to be helpful and increasingly important for 
governments stimulate a forward-looking attitude, there is little reflection on how do futurists deal 
with policy in policy-oriented foresight. The text books state that future policy should not be included 
in the scenarios to allow policy-makers to "wind-tunnel" future policies. Based upon ethnographic 
analysis in the Netherlands and on a review of internationally developed scenarios, we examine 
futurists’ strategies and struggles with the policy-free ideal.
Policy-oriented foresight, foresight in action, ethnographic research, policy-free ideal, 
scenarios
Introduction
Governments are confronted with a large number of complex challenges, such as climate 
change, the depletion of natural resources and the financial systems. While facts are uncertain, 
stakes are high and decisions urgent (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1992). The various systems are in 
flux, governments are expected to consider and prepare for future change and take decisions 
that reduce risks and stimulate desired developments. 
Such anticipatory governance (Barben et al., 2008; Guston, 2008; Fuerth, 2009) requires 
a forward-looking attitude which can be fostered with activities referred to as “foresight’’. 
There are different ways of looking at policy futures, with different challenges, opportunities 
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and important aspects, such as forecasts (exploring the most probable future), 
scenarios (exploring multiple possible or desirable futures) and speculation (e.g. 
exploring high impact, low probability futures) (Asselt et al, 2010a; Enserink et 
al., 2013; Veenman, 2013, Dammers et al., 2013). Policy-oriented foresight aims 
at increasing the effectiveness of decision-making processes by contributing  to 
systematic thinking in the policy realm about the uncertain future. It seeks to inform 
the development of policy that is ‘robust’, meaning that it helps “to improve the 
probability of desirable ones [futures], decrease the probability of the undesirable 
ones, and gear up to coping with the inconceivable sure to come” (Dror, 2006: 
90). Foresight exercises can be initiated by policy-oriented institutes or are carried 
out at the request of, or even commissioned by, specific policy makers. ‘Policy-
oriented foresight’ (van Asselt et al., 2010b) refers to systematic study of what the 
future might hold, in which endeavour scientific knowledge is used, which is aimed 
at policy audiences. The target audience is “policy”, which is conceptualized in 
practice as a specific minister or ministry, or more vaguely as “policy makers” or “the 
government”. Policy-oriented foresight is deployed when thinking about the future 
becomes too complicated to do without any aid or ‘on the back of an envelope’ (van 
Asselt et al., 2010a). 
Many policy-oriented foresights involve the development of a set of scenarios. 
A common and often used approach advertised in scenario text books is the 
development of “policy-free scenarios”. The underlying idea, which is rooted in 
experiences with scenarios in business contexts, is that future policy should not be 
included in the scenarios so as to allow policy-makers to test or ‘wind-tunnel’ their 
future policies: by confronting different (sets of) policies with various possible 
futures, it is analyzed which policy options perform relatively well across a range 
of scenarios. So the scenarios differ on various (uncertain) variables, but future 
policy is not included as a scenario variable. By implication, in such policy-free 
scenarios, it is assumed that policy makers do not act. In scenario exercises in which 
this ideal prevails, it is often argued that 1). varying policy across the scenarios 
would complicate policy-makers’ efforts to introduce and compare new policies and 
measures and to understand the impacts of different assumptions and 2). that policy 
makers can more easily dissociate from particular futures studies when (implicit) 
political assumptions or unshared perceptions are integrated (O’Keefe and Wright, 
2010).  
Despite its many exceptions (such as GEO-4 scenarios (UNEP, 2007) in which 
different policy choices are made explicit in the various scenarios), the policy-
free ideal is often invoked by prominent members of het international foresight 
community. For example, the OECD (2008) states that their study “reflects 
how the future economy and environment might evolve in the absence of new 
policies or unforeseen disturbances” (OECD, 2008, p.513) and that “the Baseline 
[scenario] reflects no new policies, or in other words it is “policy-neutral”, it is a 
reference scenario against which simulations of new policies can be introduced and 
compared” (OECD, 2008, p.35). The IPCC SRES (2000) scenarios are presented 
as “no-climate-policy-scenarios” (Leggett et al., 1992). These scenarios reflect how 
the future might evolve in the absence of new climate policies: assumptions about 
the behavior of human systems, including that of policy makers, are held constant 
across the scenarios. Also the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) scenarios 
(Carpenter et al., 2005) exclude policy, except for one scenario that assumes climate 
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policy. So the “policy-free ideal” – despite a variety in its practical manifestation,  is 
quite common in the policy-oriented foresight community. 
In this paper, we examine how futurists actually deal with the policy-free 
principle in developing scenarios. As we aimed to achieve an understanding of 
the detailed activities that futurists perform in their effort to develop policy-free 
scenarios, studying actual practitioners is recommended (Schön, 1983; Latour and 
Woolgar, 1986; Knorr-Cetina, 1995). Informed by ethnographic research in the 
Dutch policy-oriented foresight community, we are able to question the policy-free 
ideal as a very complicated, ambiguous, if not counterproductive, ambition. We 
focused on Dutch practice, because policy-oriented foresight is relatively big and 
highly institutionalized in the Netherlands and because Dutch experiences serve as 
source of inspiration for foresight endeavours internationally.
In section 2, we discuss the prominence of the policy-free ideal in the foresight 
literature. In section 3, we elaborate on our research approach, while in section 4 we 
analyze actual practice around the policy-free principle. In the concluding section, 
we discuss the implications of our findings for anticipatory governance. With our 
empirically informed analysis, we aim to stimulate reflection and discussion about 
the policy-free principle among practitioners and academics. We argue that the 
question of how to (better) deal with policy in foresight is critical in view of the 
aspirations summarized in anticipatory governance. 
The policy-free ideal 
The practice of policy-oriented foresight is strongly rooted in organizational 
foresight, i.e. futures studies aimed to explore relevant futures for a particular 
client, such as a company or a governmental service, and more particular in the so-
called Shell scenario tradition (Schwartz, 1991; van der Heijden, 1996; Grant, 2003; 
Sharpe and van der Heijden, 2007). The idea of policy-free scenarios, i.e. a scenario 
that does not make any assumptions about future policy, is common in this branch of 
foresight. 
Authors deal differently with policy within their scenarios. Sometimes, the ideal 
is called “policy-free”, but also other approaches are used in which policy plays at 
least a fuzzy role, such as “non-intervention scenario”, “baseline scenario” “(current) 
trend scenario” (Alcamo et al., 2005 and Girod et al., 2009) or contextual scenarios 
(Howard et al., 2002). Although not mentioned explicitly, (most of) the types of 
scenarios these authors refer to, do imply that the foresight study focuses upon 
the variables and dynamics that are not directly influenced by the institution for 
which the scenarios are meant. In other words, policy does not play a role in these 
scenarios. Possible alterations in the policy, which are at the basis of the different 
scenarios, are not mentioned.  
The body of literature that focus on policy-oriented foresight in particular is 
rather small, but, the idea of assessing the future in the form of policy-free scenarios 
is, implicitly or explicitly, endorsed (Ringland, 1998, 2002a, 2002b; Nekkers, 
2006). Scenarios should describe possible futures which are the upshot of interplays 
between various driving forces in which it is assumed that the client of the foresight 
would not act. As the assumed or targeted clients of this type of foresight are policy 
makers, the policy-free principle implies that no future policy is included. As the 
driving forces and the interplays are uncertain, it is still possible to construct a set 
of scenarios that significantly differ. Also in such publications it can be read that 
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policy-free scenarios allow users (i.e. policy makers) to test or wind tunnel their 
future strategies, measures (policy options) and develop robust policies. 
So the policy-free principle is associated with a particular mode of use for 
which the scenarios are arguably developed. This mode of use is routinely referred 
to as “wind tunneling” or “robustness testing” (van der Heijden, 1996; Ringland, 
1998; Grant, 2003; Sharpe & van der Heijden, 2007; Nekkers, 2006; Lempert et al., 
2006): the scenarios serve as means to test policies in order to figure out whether 
a particular policy is “robust”, i.e. policies “that appear to trigger a favorable 
future, that seem to avoid highly undesirable ones, and that are flexible enough to 
be changed or reversed if new insights emerge” (van Asselt, 2000, p.5). In other 
words, a set of policies is confronted with a range of scenarios in order to test their 
robustness. Robust policies indicate that it performs, across a range of scenarios, 
relatively well. More specifically, by confronting different (sets of) policies with 
various possible futures, it is analyzed, which policies can be implemented in any or 
in some of the scenarios, which policies should not be implemented in any scenario 
and/or which policies should be implemented immediately or later on (Dammers et 
al., 2013).
The idea is that scenarios in which future policy is integrated cannot be used for 
wind tunneling and robustness testing. In other words, expectations about the use of 
the scenarios play a role in framing the foresight endeavor as a necessarily “policy-
free exercise”. This is for example visible in Carpenter et al. (1995), leading authors 
of Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) scenarios, who observed that there is 
in particular a strong interests among policy-makers “in being able to evaluate the 
“costs” and “benefits” of long-term climate goals vis-à-vis the situation without 
climate policy” (p.575-576). 
The idea that experts should assess the future through the development of 
policy-free scenarios is also prominent among foresight practitioners. In water 
management and climate change literature, for example, it is popular to present 
scenarios as a means to find robust strategies and policy (Lempert and Groves, 2006; 
2010; Biesbroek et al., 2009; Hallegatte, 2010; Wilby and Dessai, 2010; Haasnoot 
2013). The policy-free ideas expressed in foresight literature are obviously part of 
the practitioners’ frame of reference, as the following futurists’ quote taken from 
Dutch foresight practice illustrates: 
“I want that the people from VROM [the former Ministry of 
Environment and Spatial Planning] could use our scenarios to analyze 
policies. If you already incorporate policy [in the scenarios], you cannot use 
the scenarios to that end” (field notes, March 23, 2004).
Also van der Heijden himself, generally considered one of the leading authors 
on the Shell approach, contended that policy-free foresight ends up “overemphasizing 
how far the context limits the scope for (..) action” (Ramírez & van der Heijden, 
2007, p.97). They qualify this approach to the future as “reactive”. Ramírez & van 
der Heijden (2007) wonder how it is possible that “scenarios have ended up lodged 
in this rationalist positivist corner, while its origins were of a more exploratory 
nature” (p.97-98). In this context they refer to the original idea of foresight phrased 
by Herman Kahn as “to think the unthinkable”. So the question is whether the 
policy-free principle, routinely referred to in descriptions of how to do foresight, is 
well grounded and well thought. 
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Notwithstanding this critique, the policy-free principle is part of the majority 
view in contemporary foresight literature on how to assess the future. Nevertheless, 
how this principle is practiced is not examined and discussed in the scholarly 
literature on foresight. Moreover, it is difficult to find publications that address 
the related topic of including or excluding an endogenous actor (Tapinos, 2013). 
Dilemmas with regard to contextual or ‘non-intervention’ scenarios in policy-
oriented foresight are outlined (Van der Steen and van der Duin, 2012; De Smedt 
et al., 2013), but without examining the idea of policy-free scenarios. Through 
observing foresight in action, we, however, witnessed how this principle served as 
an ambition in Dutch foresight practice, while concurrently it was also clear that the 
futurists agreed that for good reasons a truly policy-free foresight is not defendable. 
Below we will detail how this ambivalent attitude played out in practice. 
Researching foresight in action
In this paper, we describe foresight in action informed by observations in and 
around six Dutch policy-oriented foresight studies at two governmental institutes 
charged with policy advice. Dutch policy-oriented foresight is an attractive site for 
studying foresight in action for a number of reasons. In the Netherlands, policy-
oriented foresight is relatively big and highly institutionalized. Furthermore, Dutch 
experiences serve as source of inspiration for foresight endeavours elsewhere. For 
example, the Environmental Outlooks of the Dutch environmental agency (RIVM) 
(RIVM, 1988; 1991/1992; 1993; 1997; 2000) inspired the United Nations to produce 
the Global Environment Outlook series and served as a benchmark for foresight 
activities of the European Environment Agency (EEA). The Dutch environment 
agency is actively involved in international environmental foresight, such as in 
the IPCC scenario endeavours. Some Dutch studies are available in English, like 
the “Scanning the Future” and “Four Futures of Europe” reports produced by The 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) (CPB, 1992; de Mooij 
& Tang, 2003). The Scanning the Future-report is cited in English, French and 
Spanish publications, involving articles in peer-reviewed journals (ranging from 
Ecological Economics to Journal of Business Ethics, from Transportation Planning 
& Technology to the Journal of Housing & Built Environment) and various scenario 
studies and foresight endeavours, such as Bertrand (1999), Gallopín (2004), Raskin 
(2005), and the IPCC Fourth Assessment report (IPCC, 2007). This illustrates the 
role of Dutch foresight in the international scene. 
Informed by intense observation in Dutch foresight practice, we examined what 
futurists actually do when they (try to) develop policy-free scenarios. We aimed to 
“inscribe” (Geertz, 1973/1999) real-time mechanisms at work (Knorr-Cetina, 1995) 
by means of so-called thick descriptions, which are informative stories attentive to 
details. Such in situ monitoring or “participant observation” as a research approach 
is generally associated with ethnography, a research style which is rooted in 
anthropology (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995 for a well-referenced introduction). 
We are not unique in applying it to foresight (Dobbinga, 2001; Brooks, 2004; Burt et 
al., 2010; O’Keefe et al., 2010). 
What does it mean to inscribe? The researcher “writes it down. In so doing, he 
turns it from a passing event, which exists only in its own moment of occurrence, 
into an account, which exists in its inscriptions and can be reconsulted” (Geertz, 
1973/1999, p.19). Our empirical research in foresight practice enabled us to produce 
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thick descriptions of what futurists active in the context of public policy actually do. 
Through the stories told2, we aim to inscribe and explicate how professional futurists 
in policy-oriented foresight deal with policy in general and with the policy-free 
principle in particular. The aspiration is that our reflection-on-action account will 
help futurists—in the Netherlands and elsewhere—to understand and recognize the 
complexities of their endeavor and we aim to provide insights that they can benefit 
from. 
In this five year research endeavour, we have observed futurists in action in two 
Dutch institutes, namely the Netherland Institute for Spatial Planning (then RPB, 
now integrated in the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) and the 
energy research centre ECN. Per institute, we included three foresight endeavours 
in our field work. These observed foresight project had some characteristics in 
common: interdisciplinarity (e.g. the RPB project teams consistented of various 
disciplines, such as: econometry, sociology, demography, public adminstration, 
geography, environmental science, and/or design), a complex project structure (the 
projects consistent of thematic teams  -  such as team “housing and mobility”, “nature, 
agriculture and water”, “big cities”, and ‘energy – and a core team with the leaders 
of the thematic teams and the project coordinator(s)) and cooperation with a large 
number external institutes with particular knowledge (e.g. statistics), tools (e.g. 
quantitative models) and expertise. In addition, all the foresight endeavors included 
in our research were explicitly policy-oriented. They all aimed at being relevant 
to actors in the policy realm and to policy makers (civil servants and politicians) 
in particular. The observed foresight endeavours ranged from rather qualitative 
assessments (e.g. the “SCENE”-project3 (RPB, 2003a)) to more quantitative (e.g. 
the “WLO”-project4 (CPB, MNP and RPB, 2006); ECN contributed to this foresight 
with an assessment of energy futures (unpublished papers), which provided the 
basis for the energy chapter in CPB, MNP and RPB, 2006) and baseline scenario 
exercises (the so-called “Referentieraming”5-project at ECN (van Dril en Elzenga 
2005)) and from exploratory (e.g. the “VVR”-project6 (RPB, 2003b)) to more hybrid 
scenario exercises, involving both qualitative and quantitative approaches (e.g. the 
“BETER7”-project which ran from 2002 until 20048). 
In the period 2001–2006, we pursued extensive participant observation among 
practitioners involved in actual foresight endeavors in the Netherlands. We chose 
to reside to what we came to call “ethnographic moments” over the course of these 
5 years instead of a shorter period of a couple of weeks or months of full-time 
participant-observation. In this way it would facilitate us to endorse a fresh view on 
the practices. Also, many foresight endeavours we observed took 1-2 years or ever 
longer (plannen or unplanned). For our research interest in the development process, 
it was important that we could be involved over de full course of a foresight project. 
This approach enabled us to cover six foresight endeavours in action and more that 
140 ethnographic moments. 
During these ethnographic moments, we made notes on what we saw happening, 
on what we saw futurists doing and on what we heard them say, including non-
verbal behavior in project meetings and workshops and monitored phone calls or 
bilateral chats. We talked with them and asked questions, both informally and in 
arranged open interview settings. In addition, we collected documents produced by 
the futurists, and other texts which featured in the futurists’ activities. We retrieved 
and received e-mails, we took pictures, we audio recorded many meetings and 
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transcribed the tapes. We shared some observations with the futurists and recorded 
their feedback.
We employed a multi-method approach. In addition to the participant 
observation in the two Dutch institutes, we investigated other foresight practices (see 
for examples van Notten et al., 2003), which enabled us to reflect on our findings. 
Furthermore, we scrutinized a large number and a wide range of foresight reports 
(see for an overview of studies van Asselt et al., 2001; van Asselt et al., 2005 and 
van Notten et al., 2003), we carried out a retrospective case-study on a particular 
European foresight endeavour (van Asselt et al., 2005), and we ran an experiment 
to explore particular foresight approaches in practice9. We furthermore benefitted 
from revisiting earlier empirical research in Dutch foresight practice (van Asselt, 
2000; see also van Asselt et al., 2010b). This field work constitutes the core of our 
empirical study of foresight practice. 
In addition to our research in Dutch foresight practice, for this paper, we also 
examined three highly influential international scenario studies: the IPCC SRES 
(2000), OECD’s Environmental Outlook to 2030 (2008) and UNEP’s Global 
Environmental Outlook (GEO-4) (2007). Unlike the IPCC and GEO-4 scenarios, 
the OECD report does not present a range of possible scenarios, but a baseline 
scenario. We analysed the ways of dealing with policy through document analysis, 
literature review and exchanges with experts involved in the international scenario 
endeavours. We do not claim that this multi-method approach enables us to 
generalize. However, it helps to put our observations into a broader context. The 
additional research activities facilitated us to evaluate which of our observations are 
typically Dutch, and which reveal more general insights into foresight practices.
Based on this empirical data, we were able to tell different stories about 
foresight in action, e.g. about how professional futurists practice the scenario 
matrix (van ‘t Klooster and van Asselt, 2006; van’t Klooster, 2007; van Asselt et 
al., 2010b), how they deal with prospective uncertainty (van Asselt et al., 2007; van 
Asselt et al., 2010b); about the meaning of time in foresight (van Asselt et al., 2010b 
van ‘t Klooster and van Asselt, 2011) and how futurists deal with policy (van Asselt 
et al., 2010b and this paper). 
Coping with the policy in foresight practice
Although policy-free scenarios are presented in foresight literature as the 
ideal and supreme approach to the assessment of the future, futurists involved in 
actual foresight exercises often in the same breath consider developing policy-
free scenarios as unachievable and even undesirable in their foresight endeavor. 
We heard futurists arguing “fully policy-free is impossible”, “we cannot assume 
that in the future policy makers are blind. That is not realistic” and “the [future] 
world is not without policy” (field notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004). In another 
meeting, a futurist warned: “We should not define policy away” (field notes WLO-
project, May 11, 2004). When there will be new circumstances (for example, “huge 
economic growth”) or “bottlenecks” (for example with regard to mobility), “policy 
makers will respond. That is what policy makers do.” Or in other words: “It is not 
realistic [to assume] that from today onward no policy will be pursued” (field notes 
WLO-project, March 23, 2004). 
In the IPCC scenario practice, Girod et al. (2009) observed comparable struggles 
between the policy-free principle (to which they refer as “non-intervention”) and 
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the actual scenarios. Whereas the SRES scenarios are classified as “non-intervention 
scenarios”, i.e. scenarios that do not include additional climate initiatives, the 
scenario classification was strongly criticized (see for example the comments on 
SRES drafts (IPCC, 2000c) and Raskin et al., 2005). Main point of critique was 
that implicitly different input assumptions with regard to policy were used in the 
different scenarios, as in some allegedly “non-intervention scenarios” assumptions 
were made about climate policies to reduce greenhouse gases. Girod et al. (2009) 
therefore conclude that the classification of the SRES scenarios as ‘non-intervention’ 
scenarios “is undoubtedly misleading” (p.114). They suggest that also in the IPCC 
SRES  scenario process, implementing the policy-free principle was not a smooth 
endeavor. 
The various observations indicate that foresight practitioners search for a 
kind of compromise with regard to dealing with policy. For example, in one of 
the foresight projects observed, it was the explicit assignment “to forget policy as 
much as possible”, which was in line with the policy-free principle. At the same 
time the addition “as much as possible” already indicated that fully policy-free was 
considered difficult or even impossible to achieve. Notwithstanding the implicit 
and explicit recognition that policy-free is a difficult, if not unattainable, ideal, the 
“forget policy” assignment was apparently upheld and further referred to as “VROM 
neutral”, that is assuming no change in the policies of the Ministry of Spatial 
Planning and Environment (in Dutch abbreviated to VROM). At first glance, the 
“VROM neutral” starting point may seem to be in line with the policy-free principle. 
However, it actually assumed that current policy will extend into the future and/or 
that policies currently proposed will be implemented. So this interpretation actually 
meant a shift: neutral meant no policy change instead of no policy. The VROM 
neutral principle thus prompted inclusion of policy in the scenarios. In practice, in 
all of the observed endeavors, the futurists diverted from the policy-free principle 
and included policy in their outlooks in one way or the other. 
Why do the futurists in foresight practice continue to perceive the unattainable 
policy-free principle as the supreme ambition? Policy-free is associated with 
a-political, “value-free” and “scientific” (various field notes), which is considered 
the preferred stance for experts. In various exchanges and statements uttered that it 
is important for futurists to be a-political. For example: 
“Our work is to refer to what actually happens, and to base our 
assumptions [on that knowledge] instead of reasoning from desired futures” 
(field notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004). 
and
“We cannot prioritize, because we don’t have a normative frame. That 
means that we cannot say anything about what would be better, (..) worse 
or nicer (..), because that is a political choice” (field notes WLO-project, 
November 18, 2004). 
We concluded that foresight practitioners search for a kind of compromise with 
regard to dealing with policy: both policy-free as well as government as a truly 
endogenous actor are considered unachievable or undesirable ideals. The attitudes 
with regard to the policy-free principle are ambivalent. On the one hand, the policy-
free principle is still casted as the supreme or desired approach to assessing the 
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future. In our view, this preference is sustained because of the aim to do a-political 
policy-oriented foresight. The a-political stance is interpreted as “scientific”, which 
is the kind of qualification the futurists aim at. On the other hand, policy-free 
is considered an unattainable or even undesirable ideal. The futurists regard the 
assumption that in the future no policy is pursued as unrealistic. In their view that 
would yield trivial outcomes. Furthermore, policy is considered an essential driving 
force in society’s development. The futurists cannot imagine how it would work in 
a policy-free world: governments are crucial actors, who respond to changes and 
bring about change. So they fear that wholly policy-free scenarios are either of bad 
quality and/or useless for policy. In this situation of ambivalence, the futurists aim at 
finding a middle ground between policy-free assessment and including government 
as an endogenous actor. Below, we will attend in detail to the construction of such 
compromises. 
The “no (significant) policy change” principle
In all foresight endeavours observed, the futurists departed from the policy-
free principle. Policy was in one way or the other, to a smaller or larger extent, a 
component of assessing the future. Informed by our observations, we conclude that 
futurists preferred a stance between the unattainable policy-free ideal on the one 
hand and policy as a fully endogenous part of the outlooks on the other. This stance, 
to which the observed futurists referred with terms such as “neutral”, “policy poor” 
and “minimally differentiated trend policy”, can be characterized as no (significant) 
policy change (see box 1) compared to current policy. This stance means that the 
futurists use current policy as a basis to construct future policy. This construction 
involves a kind of extrapolation of current policy over the time period covered in 
the foresight. The futurists themselves also referred to this approach in terms of 
“extrapolating policy” and “extrapolating the developments [in policy] of the last 
years” (various field notes). It also entails that this constructed future policy is 
ideally kept constant over the different scenarios, although we witnessed that slight 
adjustments in the spirit of the scenario are considered acceptable. In this way, the 
futurists tried to balance the a-political, academic ambitions on the one hand with 
ideas about good and relevant content. 
Box 1. Minimally differentiated trend policy
Each project adopted, implicitly or explicitly, the no (significant) policy change 
stance as its point of departure. This was most explicit in the Welvaart en 
Leefomgeving (WLO) endeavor. In the foresight practice, the futurists proposed 
the “minimally differentiated trend policy” principle as their compromise between 
policy-free and endogenous government. This concept was the upshot of earlier 
experiences, serious thoughts and discussions. 
How was minimally differentiated trend policy conceptualized? The basic ideas 
behind “trend policy” and “minimally differentiated” were introduced as follows: 
In presenting the WLO endeavor to other colleagues, one of the 
project leaders explained that “minimally differentiated trend policy” is 
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an important attribute of the scenarios. Futurists T explicitly admitted 
that the scenarios will not be “fully policy free”. Trends in policy will be 
extrapolated. However, because the futurists consider this extrapolation 
of policy “not so realistic”, some room for manoeuvre is incorporated. 
For each scenario, especially after 2020, policy will be assumed that is 
in line the scenario, while it minimally differs from the extrapolation 
of current policy (Field notes, 21 August, 2003). This approach was 
also described in another session as “we are not groping in the dark 
with regards to [future] policy”. There will be changes in policy, but 
we assume “adjustments in the spirit of current policy. That needs to be 
consistent” (field notes, 23 March 2004). 
The various foresight endeavors adopted, implicitly or explicitly, the no 
(significant) policy change stance as their point of departure. In one project in 
particular, the futurists proposed the “minimally differentiated trend policy” 
principle as their compromise between policy-free and endogenous government. 
This concept was the upshot of earlier experiences, serious thoughts and discussions. 
How was “minimally differentiated trend policy” conceptualized? The basic 
ideas behind “trend policy” and “minimally differentiated” were introduced as 
follows: 
In presenting the scenario project to other colleagues, one of the 
project leaders explained that “minimally differentiated trend policy” 
is an important attribute of the scenarios. Futurist T. explicitly admitted 
that the scenarios will not be “fully policy-free”. Trends in policy will be 
extrapolated. However, because the futurists consider this extrapolation 
of policy “not so realistic”, some room for maneuver is incorporated. For 
each scenario, especially after 2020, policy will be assumed that is in line 
with the scenario, while it minimally differs from the extrapolation of 
current policy (field notes WLO-project (lunch lecture by project leader), 
August 21, 2003). This approach was also described in another session as 
“we are not groping in the dark with regard to [future] policy”. There will 
be changes in policy, but we assume “adjustments in the spirit of current 
policy. That needs to be consistent” (field notes WLO-project, March 23, 
2004) 
“Trend policy” is referred to as the continuation of governmental policy in 
the past decennia and recently established policy. “Minimally differentiated trend 
policy” is a way of enhancing the plausibility and consistency of the scenarios by 
slightly varying future policy (and related consequences) across the scenarios. 
Although the policy-free principle obviously resonated on the level of ambitions, 
in none of the foresight endeavours observed did the futurists seriously attempt to 
apply the principle. In practice, the “no (significant) policy change” principle served 
as starting point. 
Questioning “no (significant) policy change”
Notwithstanding the prevailing consensus with regard to the “no (significant) 
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policy change” principle, at the same time this starting point continued to be 
critiqued. The overall question “what is current policy?” was raised in a critical 
sense in various meetings. In such discussions, it was questioned whether the idea 
of reasoning from current policy assumed in this approach was actually feasible. 
For example, in the following exchange the “no (significant) policy change” starting 
point was openly put into question:
One of the futurists asked: “How are you going to do that [extrapolating 
policy], when there is no policy? In that case, you put policy in the 
scenarios”, on the other hand, in extrapolating policy: “it is assumed that 
the current government will be 40 years in power. We should not assume 
that. It is possible to reverse, to adjust policy and laws. Also today’s policy 
impulses do not necessarily define the future” (field notes WLO-project, 
March 23, 2004).
and
Futurist J. stated: “A trend break [in government policy] is not what 
we want”. Futurist C. objected: “It is not about what we want. The 
question is what the scenarios tell us”. In his view, the foresight should 
be about possibilities: “I just want to understand how it could work”, 
with as consequence that “in the one scenario the government wants to do 
something and the government doesn’t want to act in another scenario” 
(field notes WLO-project, November 18, 2004).
In the latter scene, also the prescription that future policy is the same in each of 
the scenarios is questioned. We witnessed that more often. For example, we heard a 
futurist suggesting: 
“Couldn’t we formulate (..) policy per scenario? (..) I don’t think it 
[policies] has to be similar in all scenarios. That is the other extreme” (field 
notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004).
Both kinds of doubts, pertaining to whether it is possible to extrapolate policy 
and whether it is needed to keep the constructed policy constant in all scenarios, are 
expressed in the following contribution:
“Is trend policy still defendable?”, “Shouldn’t we differentiate 
per scenario?” and “Wouldn’t it be better if we incorporate different 
perspectives on government in the different scenarios?” (field notes WLO-
project, March 23, 2004).
The most fundamental criticism voiced pertained to whether “no (significant) 
policy change” is as a-political as the futurists (and text books) wanted it to be. 
Policy is by definition political. Also current policy is the upshot of a particular 
political process. Assuming that current policy is implemented and extended into the 
future is, in the end, favoring a particular set of political choices. Various futurists 
warned that different normative opinions exist on “what is considered good in 
current policy”, indicating that a “neutral” position in a normative sense with regard 
to current policy is impossible. 
This kind of questioning of the “no (significant) policy change” principle (and 
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the associated idea of policy kept constant over the set of scenarios) could be heard 
now and then. However, we observed that this kind of criticism, although present, 
remained marginal, in the sense that the “no (significant) policy change” principle 
continued to be endorsed. 
Struggling with policy
In all foresight practices observed, the “no (significant) policy change” principle 
continued to be the central point of reference in the foresight endeavors. However, 
we witnessed that this starting point yielded a number of issues, which turned out 
difficult to solve or address. These issues involved questions such as:
• which policy documents to take as basis for defining current policy?
• how to deal with policies formulated over the course of the foresight 
endeavour?
• who is the policy maker?
• how to extrapolate policy?
The first issues refer to what to take as points of reference for defining current 
policy. The last issue refers to how to construct future policy from the points 
of reference. We will elaborate the issues pertaining to points of reference and 
constructing future policy with some salient observations. In some of these, the 
doubts about the “no (significant) policy change” principle discussed in the previous 
section reappeared as problems in practicing this principle.  
Struggle 1: Which policy documents to take as a basis for defining current policy?
The futurists struggled with the issue which policy document to take as basis 
for defining current policy. In one of the projects, the “no (significant) policy 
change” stance was translated into the “VROM neutral” principle. In doing so, the 
issue which policy documents to take as a basis for defining current policy was 
narrowed down to the policy documents of the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning. But it turned out that this was not enough to solve the issue. In one of 
the project workshops (field notes SCENE-project, December 14, 2001), it was 
argued that various memoranda from the Ministry existed, which are not all geared 
to one another. So the question which documents to take was narrowed down, but 
not solved. In another foresight endeavor, various policy memoranda from various 
ministries were listed as relevant for the foresight endeavor (various field notes, 
VVR-project). Thus, in this case it did not just involve various competing policy 
memoranda from one ministry, but it concerned policies from various ministries as 
well as policies on the national, provincial and local level. The policies were listed 
without explaining how they would be used and how tensions between the different 
policies ought to be dealt with. 
Struggle 2: How to deal with policies formulated over the course of the foresight 
endeavor?
We also witnessed intense debates on how to consider new policy. In particular, 
because the issue also had a temporal dimension, i.e. “what to do in case of recent 
policy change?” This quandary is visible in the following positioning: 
“We take the policy change as starting point. We have said, we first look 
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at the last ten years, and then we consider the last two years. If something is 
proposed [in recent policy], we have to include that in a sound way” (field 
notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004). 
The issue was further complicated as during the foresight endeavors, which 
usually lasted one to two years or even longer, also policy was produced. How to 
deal with such new policy was a serious challenge in various foresight endeavors. 
For example, during one of the projects, the “Nota Ruimte”, the long term spatial 
policy plan of the Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning, was launched: 
“This memorandum did not exist last year, it has appeared during our 
process” (field notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004). In discussing the 
issue, one of the project leaders stated explicitly: “The connection with 
policy (..) is difficult. If we allow trend policy to deviate from new policy, 
our foresight is difficult to sell”. Also in this discussion, the question what 
to take as basis is observable: “Current policy is not the Nota Ruimte. I 
have heard that there are two positions in the Cabinet”. Furthermore “the 
Nota Luchtvaart [air transport policy] will follow. Are we sure we have to 
consider all [new policies]?”. Another futurist objected that she perceived 
the Nota Ruimte “as a further implementation of the [policy] change of the 
last years”. “To what extent does the Nota Ruimte differ from [what we 
consider] trend policy? How serious should we take the Nota Ruimte?”, 
asked another futurist. Futurist C. stated that he takes the past as starting 
point: “it has happened that way in the past years, and we take that as our 
starting point, independent of what has been written down. We extrapolate 
past policy responses and we don’t honor each desired future. One can 
write down everything in a policy document.” Futurist N. reacted: “In that 
case, you deviate from the Nota Ruimte”. Futurist C. admitted and added: “I 
don’t mind”. Futurist N. agreed: “Neither do I”. One of the project leaders 
concluded: “We won’t solve this now” and another proposed “to postpone 
this issue” (field notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004).
In the above scene, it is visible that the futurists not only struggled with the 
question which policy documents to take as basis for defining current policy in 
general, but also how to deal with new policies (proposed policy that is not officially 
established or new policy that deviates from “trend policy”), launched in the course 
of their foresight, in particular. Some preferred to use the newest policy as their 
point of reference, while others disqualify (particular) policy documents as merely 
desired futures, which should not provide the basis in their assessment of the future. 
The issue was not resolved. 
The scene above also illustrates that the “no (significant) policy change” 
principle provided limited guidance for foresight in action. 
How did the futurists proceed? Instead of resolving the issue at a strategic level 
(how to deal with the Nota Ruimte), it was delegated to other futurists or in time. 
It was asked whether and how in the various working groups the Nota Ruimte was 
dealt with. It was also explicitly suggested that dealing with the Nota Ruimte should 
be delegated to the working groups. Another proposal was to organize a “lunch 
lecture” about it, but that idea was fired: “You can read it. The Nota is publicly 
available”. Another proposed: “If we are ready, we have to check the Nota Ruimte 
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systematically”. Over the course of the discussion, the attitudes diverged from a 
coping approach to advocating serious consideration in which the project leaders 
should take the lead: 
“We could not let this pass. I can check how in the various text pieces 
[i.e. their own texts] the Nota Ruimte is treated and propose how we can 
deal with it. We have to do more than just wait and see what happens [in the 
working groups]” (field notes WLO-project, May 11, 2004).
But the discussion was not settled. It continued to sweep from one immature 
option to the other. The following remark is illustrative for the futurists’ struggle 
with how to deal with new policy: “I think, the problem will vanish in time” (field 
notes WLO-project, May 11, 2004). In an earlier discussion on this issue (field notes 
WLO-project, March 23, 2004), the futurists felt that they were struggling. One of 
them even ironically proposed “ignoring [the Nota Ruimte]” as the easiest approach. 
Both this ironic contribution and the fierce response: “NO!! Intelligent dealing [with 
the Nota Ruimte] is not ignoring it”, illustrate how tense the futurists’ struggle was. 
Struggle 3: Who is the policy maker?
In this context, it was also brought to the fore that the government is not the only 
actor deciding about policies in modern societies. This raised questions about who 
the policy maker is, as is visible in the following excerpt:
A senior futurist argued: “Next to government other actors are active.” 
In his view, the question “Who actually chooses and decides?” is not so 
easy to answer. He took business parks as example to illustrate his concern: 
“Is that due to market mechanisms or do we consider that government 
policy? Who is going to invest? Are new institutions necessary?” (field 
notes WLO-project, November 18, 2004).
The latter questions pertaining to investments and institutions also bring the 
issue of uncertainty with regard to the realization of planned policy to the fore. 
Even in case business parks were attributed to government policy, the question was 
whether it was realistic to assume that plans are implemented as planned in case 
other actors have to invest or new institutional structures have to be built. In the 
follow-up discussion, it was concluded that the “no (significant) policy change” 
principle implied the assumption that there would not be significant institutional 
change either. So they would not consider the possibility “of a private actor 
interested in public transport infrastructure. In fact, we take the current institutional 
setting as given” (field notes WLO-project, November 18, 2004). Another futurist 
concluded that: 
“The behavior of the government is captured in trend policy. But the 
scenarios might differ in how market actors operate within that context. (..) 
So trend policy only applies to the [Dutch] government.4 We have to realize 
that other actors can respond with surprises” (field notes WLO-project, 
November 18, 2004).    
The futurists thus struggled profoundly with the question “who is the policy 
maker?”. Issues that complicated the matter are competing policy documents which 
are not attuned, recent policy changes, newly issued policies, which appeared over 
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the course of the foresight endeavor as well as how to isolate government policies 
from actions of other actors. In our view, the above struggles, which were not 
solved at the strategic level, if solved at all, indicate that in foresight in action the 
practitioners’ compromise of “no (significant) policy change” could not be applied 
straightforwardly.  
In international scenario exercises, defining the policy maker and drawing the 
line between endogenous en exogenous policies seem even more complicated, as 
“the policy maker” is even more diffuse. The complexity can be illustrated by the 
way policy was defined in the IPCC (2007), where the scenarios were presented 
as “non-intervention scenarios” as far as climate policy was concerned. At first 
sight, this demarcation seems clear. However, in practice, drawing a line between 
climate policy and other related policies with climate impact is not straightforward. 
For example, is energy policy introduced against air pollution in China just energy 
policy or (also) climate policy? This illustrates that also in international foresights it 
is not straightforward to define what counts as policy intervention and what not. 
Struggle 4: How to extrapolate policy?
The next issue that appeared on stage was how to extrapolate current policy? 
There were obvious mismatches between the time horizons of policies and of the 
foresights. So it was clear that in defining future policy, the futurists had to go 
beyond what was written down in policy documents. Even long term policy plans 
used to have time horizons that did not extend as far into the future as the foresights 
aimed at. See, for example:
“With regard to infrastructure, much is already determined [in policy 
plans]. Till 2020, not much can be varied [between the scenarios] (..). We 
build the same infrastructure in the four scenarios till 2020. Afterwards, 
we will differentiate slightly, dependent on whether more or less budget is 
available” (field notes WLO-project, October 19, 2004).  
In one of the observed foresight endeavors (field notes VVR-project, December 
3, 2002), it was argued “there are no fixed policy plans for the next 30 years”, so 
they had to assume housing policies. Two other futurists agreed explicitly. One of 
them explained that in the models, it is, for example, assumed that in the future after 
2005, in which year the current national spatial planning policy plan would expire, 
every municipality would build3 according to the local demand. This served as an 
example of the kind of assumptions about government employed in constructing 
future policy. 
With regard to the issue of extending current policies into the future, various 
difficulties were identified, for example, whether it was realistic, helpful and/or 
desirable to assume that current policy would be implemented as planned. Most 
futurists argued that considerable uncertainty exists with regard to the realization 
of planned policy. Therefore questions such as “How certain do we have to be 
about building policies in order to incorporate them?” (field notes VVR-project, 
December 3, 2002) were raised. The futurists also struggled with the question how 
to extrapolate policies without creating friction-free, utopian futures (field notes 
WLO-project, March 23, 2004). One of the futurists suggested that he wanted to 
extrapolate not the policies as such, but the tensions on the housing market that 
accompanied these policies. He proposed to extrapolate the friction between supply 
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and demand, “which has historically been accepted by the government and [we 
assume that] it will be accepted in the future”. But also this proposal was debated: 
“Let’s assume that there is a tension due to shortage of policy. You extrapolate that 
into the future, while the recent trend is to push back the deficit. What do you take 
as starting point? The friction or the policy effort of the last 2, 3 years?” (field notes 
WLO-project, March 23, 2004). In the follow-up discussion, it was, furthermore, 
questioned whether the friction idea could be applied to all kind of policies and it 
was warned that they should not “wrongly introduce bottlenecks in the scenarios”. 
With regard to infrastructure, it was argued that “[we] can reasonably assume that 
roads will be build. (..) About mobility, [in the scenarios] we have to respond to 
bottlenecks, that is what policy-makers do”. One of the other futurists felt lost: 
“Which bottlenecks do you want to solve [in the scenarios]” by assuming policy, and 
which not?”. The futurists then talked about standing midway between driving blind 
and defining bottlenecks away by assuming perfectly adequate future policy. 
We read this course of debate–in which a proposal presented as a solution (to 
counteract friction-free, utopian futures) degenerated to an unclear compromise 
stance – as an example of how the futurists struggle with the, at face value simple, 
idea of extrapolating (past and present) policy into the future. 
With regard to constructing future policy, we also witnessed intense struggles 
at the strategic level and very pragmatic ways of dealing with policy at the tactical 
level, which were not necessarily in accordance with the idea of “no (significant) 
policy change”. Although this idea was already constructed as a compromise in 
view of the unattainable and undesirable policy-free ideal, we observed that new 
intermediate positions had to be constructed and very pragmatic choices had to be 
made in order to proceed. 
Coping with policy
The futurists explicitly deviated from the policy free principle, which was 
considered unachievable and undesirable, but they did not want to include the policy 
maker as an endogenous actor either. In the foresights observed, a compromise was 
formulated which we inscribed as the “no (significant) policy change” principle. We, 
furthermore, observed that the futurists struggled with applying this principle in their 
actual assessment endeavor. Both with regard to defining the points of reference 
and with regard to constructing future policy from these points of reference, issues 
could not be solved at the strategic level. Coping with policy is a more adequate 
description then dealing with it, which suggest some kind of coherent strategy. We 
conclude that the “no (significant) policy change” principle provided inadequate 
guidance for how to deal with policy in foresight in action. It was, however, not 
disregarded. Notwithstanding the fact that criticism was voiced, it remained the 
common frame of reference. 
We conclude that neither the policy-free principle nor the “no (significant) 
policy change” principle facilitate the futurists in dealing with policy. Neither of the 
principles provides sufficient, if any, guidance what to do at the practical level. In 
our view, the state-of-affairs in policy-oriented foresight is adequately described as 
struggling with policy, which, we think, is exemplified in the following scene:
Futurist T. argued that with regard to “the question how we will 
deal with policy [in this foresight] (..) we need to make a thinking turn”. 
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Informed by the discussion, he concluded that “we are now essentially 
back to the start of this endeavor”. As they obviously wrestled with the 
issue, the project leader suggested “postponing” the issue of dealing with 
policy and to discuss it in another meeting with other people (referred to 
as “the coordinators”) “both in practical and strategic terms”. Later in the 
meeting, another futurist tried to return to the issue, but that discussion was 
immediately cut with reference to the appointment that it was delegated to 
the coordinators (field notes WLO-project, March 23, 2004).
In this exchange, the futurists explicitly admitted that they struggle with how to 
deal with policy. Their coping strategy is to delegate it, either to other futurists or in 
time. We consider this scene exemplary for what we observed in foresight practice 
with regard to the question how to deal with policy in the scenarios of the future. 
The futurists agreed that in one way or the other, the scenarios should include future 
policy, but they struggled with doing so, both on the strategic level of principles and 
guidelines as well as on the tactical level. 
Policy-oriented foresight and anticipatory governance
Policy-oriented foresight is potentially an important input or even necessary part 
of anticipatory governance, as it provides policy-makers with long-term insights. So 
far, policy-oriented foresight has rarely been studied as a particular branch of futures 
studies, with its own requirements. Too easily it has been assumed that principles 
useful in organizational foresight can, or even should, also guide policy-oriented 
foresight. 
In this paper, we examined how policy-oriented futurists deal with policy in 
actual foresight practice. We observed the text book ideal of policy free scenarios, 
which is associated with a particular mode of use, referred to as wind tunneling 
and robustness testing. This ideal is transplanted from organizational foresight to 
policy-oriented futures studies, without due consideration. Our analysis reveals 
that notwithstanding the lip service paid to the policy free ideal, also among 
policy-oriented futurists, the policy-free principle is considered an unattainable 
and/or undesirable approach in actual foresight practices. So the text book ideal is 
practically disregarded. This is, however, not realized in many publications and front 
stage portrayals of foresight endeavors. 
We demonstrated that in practice, policy-oriented futurists struggle with how 
to deal with policy in their scenarios. They have to include policy in their scenarios 
in one way or the other, but they dismiss the idea of treating the government as 
endogenous actor. We witnessed that they try to find a middle ground between two 
extremes – policy-free and government as an endogenous actor. We inscribed the 
favored compromise can the “no (significant) policy change” principle. Although 
this principle sounds simple and straightforward at face value, we have indicated 
that it is not. It requires extrapolating past and present policy into the future, which 
actually favors a particular set of policy choices. We demonstrated that futurists 
struggle with what to take as points of reference and how to construct future policy 
from these dubious points of reference. These issues were not solved at the strategic 
level, but delegated to the tactical level. So in practice, the “no (significant) policy 
change” principle provides inadequate support for policy-oriented foresight. 
Informed by our analysis, we argue that this issue of dealing with policy in foresight 
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receives systematic attention, both in the scholarly literature and in communities of 
practitioners. The policy-free principle is tied to a particular mode of use, referred 
to as wind tunneling and robustness testing. Our analysis implies that also this 
preferred use of scenarios needs rethinking. 
Notwithstanding actual practice, the myth of policy-free scenarios is sustained. 
This is not a harmless state of affairs. Policy-makers who want to use seemingly 
policy-free scenarios may be surprised and might wonder how to proceed. But 
also the futurists are left alone with their struggles, which may impair the further 
development of policy-oriented foresight.
If policy-oriented foresight wants to be relevant for anticipatory governance, 
innovation is needed. Experiments are needed with ways to accommodate policy. 
The pros and cons, the options and impossibilities, of government as an endogenous 
actor should be more critically examined to inform decisions in foresight practice. 
The issue of policy in foresight should not only be a topic among practitioners, but 
such experiments should be discussed and evaluated in the scholarly literature on 
futures studies. Such a collective (and demanding) effort is urgently needed. This is 
also requires systematic attention to the modes of use of policy-oriented foresight, 
while attending to the particular characteristics of this type of futures studies and 
its context of use. The issue of use of policy-oriented foresight is critical to the 
ambitions subsumed in anticipatory governance. 
The first step towards innovation of policy-oriented foresight is to openly 
acknowledge that “policy free” is an unattainable and undesirable ideal. Scholars 
and practitioners should join forces in this paradigmatic change. The second step 
is to be explicit in actual policy-oriented foresight endeavors about how policy is 
dealt with, also when primarily pragmatic and tactical choices have been made. 
More transparency is needed with regard to the nature of the exercise, as we did in 
this paper from an outsider’s perspective. Which policies are accommodated in the 
assessments, which are not and why? How are they accommodated? 
Explicating struggles and the choices made would benefit anticipatory 
governance in at least two ways. First, by being more transparent, underlying policy 
assumptions and assumptions about (anticipatory) policy-making will be outlined. 
This might “help (…) to question what kind of knowledge becomes produced, 
how and by whom” (Andersson, 2010, p.255). By having this discussion, different 
stakeholders and their perspectives can be included. The conflict that might rise by 
explicating the assumptions about policy will stimulate essential debates not only 
about the traits of policy-oriented foresight, but also about (desired and desirable) 
futures. Second, policy makers are better informed about the pros and cons of the 
foresight study and as such they are better able to use it properly in developing 
future-oriented policies. In the end, the issue of use is primarily the policy-makers’ 
responsibility, but futurists have an obligation in making transparent what they offer 
and in suggesting what are proper modes of use. Our study of foresight in action 
suggests that to date futurists do not live up to that obligation, hampered as they 
are by the “policy free” discourse. Releasing them from this heritage will seriously 
improve the prospects for anticipatory governance. 
Notes
1  First of all, we thank our informants in foresight practice. Without their participation, 
we would not have been able to write this paper. We reserve a special word of 
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thanks to Livia Smits for her contributions to an earlier version of this publication 
and Dale Rothman (University of Denver) for discussing with us the use of policy 
in international scenario studies. This paper also benefitted from the constructive 
feedback we received from anonymous reviewers. Finally, we thank the Dutch 
Science Foundation (NWO), as well as Maastricht University and Radboud 
University, for the necessary financial means. 
 An earlier version of this paper appeared as book chapter in van Asselt et al. 
(2010b).
2  The story told in this paper about the dealing with policy in foresight is just one of 
our stories about what foresight practitioners actually do. See van Asselt et al. (2007; 
2010b), van ’t Klooster (2008) and van ’t Klooster and van Asselt (2006; 2011) for 
empirically informed stories on how futurists apply tools (the scenario matrix), how 
they struggle with uncertainty, how futurists trained in various disciplines interact 
and how they try to accommodate change. 
3  An abbreviation for “een kwartet ruimtelijke SCEnario’s voor Nederland”, which 
can be translated as “a quartet scenarios for the Netherlands”.
4  An abbreviation for “Welvaart en Leefomgeving”, which can be translated as “the 
future of the Dutch Natural and Built Environment”. 
5  Referentieraming can best be translated as baseline scenario. 
6  An abbreviations for “Verkenning van de Ruimte”, which can be translated as “an 
exploration of space”.
7  An abbreviation for “ECN Beelden en Data voor de Toekomstige Energievoorziening”, 
which can be translated as “visions and data for the future energy supply”. 
8  The project documents and outcomes were primarily for internal use within ECN. So 
there is not a publicly available report on this foresight endeavour. 
 In the observation period also the single authored ECN 50 years celebration 
publication “The next 50 years: Four European energy futures” (Bruggink, 2005) 
appeared, which was loosely related to the foresight endeavours observed. We had 
an interview and some exchanges with the author, which contributed to our insights 
in ECN foresight practice.
9  For a detailed description of the experiment, see van Notten (2005, chapter 6). 
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